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Catholic Treatment Ethics and Secular Law: How Can They Cohere?
Abstract
Central elements of Roman Catholic treatment ethics include: 1) that rejection of treatment with the intent of
hastening death (even for a good end) is ethically equivalent to active euthanasia with the same intent; 2) a
distinction between morally obligatory “ordinary” treatment and morally optional “extraordinary treatment”;
3) that the quality of the patient’s life is not be a legitimate basis for rejecting treatment; and 4) that
extraordinary treatment is not forbidden, but optional, and that it is the patient or the patient’s legal
surrogate–not the doctor– who has the right to choose or reject it.
Despite these principles, even in a cultural climate fully sympathetic to Catholic treatment ethics, it is
appropriate as a legal matter to maintain the doctrine of informed consent under which it is possible for
patients or their surrogates to reject life-preserving treatment, including for unethical reasons. It is normally
impossible to enforce in practice in the external forum a differentiation between rejection of treatment for
ethically acceptable and ethically unacceptable reasons. By contrast, in cases of direct killing, such as assisting
suicide, the intent to cause death is unmistakable (as opposed to accepting an increased risk of death as a
foreseeable but unintended consequence of pursuing a good end).
In a pluralistic society Catholic ethics cannot be legislatively enforced on the ground that they are compelled
by Catholic teaching. However, the basic principles of Catholic treatment ethics may be justified based on
logic and widely accepted norms of human equality independently of revelation or ecclesiastical authority.
Particularly in protecting the right of individuals to choose and obtain life-saving medical treatment regardless
of their “quality of life,” and in suicide prevention, secular law can and should be congruent with key aspects of
Catholic health care ethics.
This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/
solidarity/vol6/iss1/4
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Thomas J. Balch
Introduction
Among  the  most  controversial  yet  common  contemporary  ethical  issues  are  those
concerning  the  provision  or  withholding  of  medical  treatment,  especially  life-preserving
health care. What does the Roman Catholic Church have to say about treatment ethics, and
how can that ethics appropriately interact with secular law in non-sectarian society?
I. Catholic Treatment Ethics
A. Intent to Cause Death or Double Effect?
The first principle of Catholic treatment ethics rejects “Euthanasia [which] in the strict
sense is understood to be an action or omission which of itself and by intention causes death,
with  the  purpose  of  eliminating  all  suffering.”1 It  deserves  emphasis  that  omission  of
treatment necessary to preserve life with the intent to cause death is treated as forbidden
euthanasia just as much as is direct killing.2
An unethical act or omission may not validly be used as a means to a good end.3 Thus,
for example, being with God in heaven might certainly be regarded as good by Christians,
and for sinful mortals only through and after death can that end come about. However, it is
not ethical to kill oneself or another in the hope and with the intent of hastening entrance into
heaven. Therefore, rejecting life-preserving treatment for Grandma with the motivation of
‘letting her go to God’ would flatly contradict this principle.
There  is,  however,  a  critically  important  distinction  between  doing  or  omitting
something in order to accomplish an unethical objective, and doing or omitting something in
order to accomplish a good objective, while regretfully recognizing and accepting that the act
or omission increases the risk of an undesirable consequence. There are courses of action or
deliberate omission in which, in the words of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith’s Declaration on Euthanasia, ‘death is in no way intended or sought, even if the risk of
it is reasonably taken’.4
Sometimes known as the principle of double effect, this recognition is really a matter of
common sense. Driving an automobile is risky. There were 1207 road deaths in Australia in
2015.5  Anyone who takes to the road in a car risks a fatal accident. Yet driving to the store to
get groceries,  knowing that involves a certain risk of death,  is not ethically equivalent to
1 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Evangelium Vitae. English translation: The Gospel of Life (25 March 1995) §64 
(emphasis in original) (Hereafter, EV).
2 Cf. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaratio de Euthanasia. English translation: 
Declaration on Euthanasia (5 May 1980) II 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_c\\hich\\af0\\dbch\\af40\\loch\\f0 
on_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html: ‘By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of 
itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated.’
3 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§1756, 1789.
4 Ibid. III.
5 Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Bureau of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Regional Economics, Road Deaths Australia–Monthly Bulletins  
https://bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/road_deaths_australia_monthly_bulletins.aspx.
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driving one’s automobile off a steep cliff in order to commit suicide. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine  any  human  activity  that  does  not  incur  some  foreseeable  risk  of  death.  Even
remaining in bed cannot escape the risk of death from fire or earthquake—and if one never
rose from it, one would certainly increase the risk of death from starvation and dehydration.
Virtually all  treatments  for a  life-threatening illness or  injury have side effects  and
risks, some of which may themselves threaten death. For instance, a surgery that is likely to
increase  the  chance  of  preserving  life  in  the  long  term  may  also  be  susceptible  to
complications that could end it in the short term, such as a blood clot or hemorrhage while on
the operating table. Treatments for conditions that harm health but are not themselves life-
threatening  may  carry  risks  of  causing  or  hastening  death.  Depending  on  the  concrete
circumstances, either choosing or foregoing such treatments might be done for reasons that
do not amount to intending death, even when a heightened risk of death from the decision is
reasonably foreseeable.6
As a committee of bishops from the United States has put it:
[W]e  are  called  by our  moral  tradition  to  ask  ourselves:  ...  [W]hat  am I  trying  to
achieve by doing it?  We must be sure that it is not our intent to cause the patient’s
death—either for its own sake or as a means to achieving some other goal such as the
relief of suffering.7
To phrase it another way, is the action or omission being chosen because of or in spite
of the increased risk of death? Whatever the probability that death may result, is the decision-
maker sincerely hoping that death will – or will not – be the consequence.
B. Is Treatment Mandatory or Optional?
A second  principle  of  Catholic  treatment  ethics  is  the  widely  familiar  distinction
between ‘ordinary’ medical treatment that is ethically mandatory and ‘extraordinary’ medical
treatment  that  is  ethically  optional.  There  are  two prongs  involved  in  assessing  whether
particular treatment is ordinary or extraordinary: treatments may ethically be foregone either
if  ‘they are  by now disproportionate  to  any expected  results  or  because  they impose  an
excessive burden on the patient and his family.’8 It is helpful to characterize these two aspects
as  separately evaluating 1) what  treatment  is  proportionate  and 2) what  duty of care for
oneself  or  others  is  reasonable  to  expect  rather  than  supererogatory.  Far  from  being
idiosyncratic sectarian positions unique to health care decisions, these reflect common sense
norms regularly relevant outside the field of health care.
1. Judging Proportionality
Regarding the first prong, in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, § 64, Pope John Paul II
wrote:
6 Cf. Marzen, O’Dowd, Crone, & Balch, ‘“Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”– Reflections Eleven Years Later’, 
Duquesne Law Review, 35, 1996, 268-70.
7 National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Pro-Life Committee [United States of America], ‘Nutrition and 
Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections’, Origins, 21:44, 9 April 1992, 705.
8 EV §65.
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[T]here is a moral obligation to care for oneself and to allow oneself to be cared for, but
this  duty  must  take  account  of  concrete  circumstances.  It  needs  to  be  determined
whether the means of treatment available are objectively proportionate to the prospects
for improvement.
Similarly, the Declaration on Euthanasia observes:
In any case, it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by studying
the type of  treatment  to be used,  its  degree of  complexity or risk,  its  cost  and the
possibilities  of  using  it,  and  comparing  these  elements  with  the  result  that  can  be
expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her physical and
moral resources.9
In discussing the principle of double effect, this article has already pointed out that
decision-making about what medical treatments to employ normally involves a balancing of
the chance of success against the risks of side effects and complications. Often it is quite
difficult  to  choose  among  alternative  treatments,  taking  into  account  the  patient’s  other
medical conditions and degree of resilience or fragility, as well as what is known or unknown
about  the  probability  of  benefit  versus  that  of  untoward  consequences.  The  higher  the
probability  of  successful  life-preserving  effect  and  the  lower  the  risk  of  negative
consequences, the more likely it  is that the treatment should be judged proportionate and
hence ethically obligatory.  Conversely, as the probability of success falls and the probability
of  negative  consequences  rises,  the  treatment  is  more  likely  to  be  disproportionate,  and
therefore ethically optional. So long as there is genuinely no intent to cause or hasten death,
under the standard of proportionality there may often be a large gray area in which different
people  might  strike  different  balances  in  judging  which  treatments  are  proportionate  or
disproportionate in particular cases.  ‘In the final analysis, it pertains to the conscience either
of the sick person, or of those qualified to speak in the sick person’s name, or of the doctors,
to decide, in the light of moral obligations and of the various aspects of the case.’10 
Is  this  not  a  matter  of  common sense  followed in  many activities  of  daily  living?
Parents, with an obligation to see to the education of their children, must weigh and balance
many factors in choosing to what schools to send them, including their academic quality, how
well they match the children’s talents and needs, their cost and their convenience. With an
obligation  to  provide  ourselves  and  those  for  whom  we  are  responsible  with  adequate
nutrition, we constantly balance the expensiveness, desirability, and healthiness of different
food choices. In fulfilling the obligation to support ourselves and our families, we weigh our
capabilities, interests, opportunities, the remuneration available, and numerous other factors
in judging what jobs to prepare for, apply for, and accept.
2. What Duty of Care Is Reasonably Expectable?
The  other  prong  of  analysis  in  distinguishing  between  ordinary  and  extraordinary
treatment asks, in effect, what duty of care is reasonably expectable. The classic statement of
this factor is by Pope Pius XII:
9 SCDF, Declaratio de Euthanasia, IV.
10 Ibid.
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[N]ormally one is held to use only ordinary means [to prolong life] – according to the
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture – that is to say, means that do not
involve any grave burdens for oneself or another. A stricter obligation would be too
burdensome for most men . . . .11
Consider a different context: a grocery store has a duty of care to keep its aisles free of
obstructions that might cause a customer to slip and fall. But the store is not an insurer, nor
does it have strict liability for any and every injury that a customer might incur by slipping
and falling in an aisle.  It only has a reasonable duty of care.  So if a customer is injured by
slipping  on  a  piece  of  lettuce  that  has  fallen  from  the  displayed  produce,  that  doesn’t
necessarily mean the store has violated its duty of care. If it can show that its employees
swept the aisle with reasonable regularity, it will not be liable. In effect, the store owes an
ordinary duty of care toward its customers, but not an  extraordinary  one. Now, there is no
mathematical formula to determine how frequently the aisle must be swept. In a trial in which
the injured customer sought recompense from the grocer, it would be up to the jury, after
hearing testimony about such things as what is the usual practice in the industry, to decide
what standard of sweeping is reasonably expectable.
This common sense approach applies to all sorts of duties of care. If a neighbor’s child
drowns  in  a  backyard  pool,  is  the  homeowner  responsible?   If  the  pool  was  unfenced,
probably the  homeowner did  not  take  what  would be regarded as  ordinary care  with  an
‘attractive nuisance’.  But if there was a high, padlocked chain fence, and the child used a
bolt cutter to get in and subsequently drowned, probably the homeowner would be deemed to
have met the standard of ordinary care. Even if it could be argued that a motion detector
rigged to an alarm might have prevented the tragedy, it is likely that installing such a system
would have been above and beyond the standard of ordinary care.
To take an example of religious duty, although there is an obligation for Catholics to
attend Mass on Sundays, they need only make ordinary, not extraordinary, efforts to do so. If
one is 250 kilometers away from the nearest church, there is probably no duty to travel that
far to attend it, even though it would be possible to drive there and back.
The same basic idea applies to the second prong for differentiating between ordinary
and extraordinary medical treatment. To take an extreme example, suppose a patient has a
rare heart disease.  Further suppose that Russian President Putin has the same disease, and
Moscow doctors have developed a treatment for it that is only available at a hospital near the
Kremlin. To fly to Moscow to seek it would be over and above the ordinary duty of care. On
the other hand, if there is a routine treatment for the disease available at every major hospital
from Melbourne to Darwin and Brisbane to Perth, there is a much better case for saying that
seeking it is part of the ordinary duty of care (although in some circumstances the treatment
might still be deemed extraordinary under the first prong of proportionality analysis).
C. Quality of Life as a Basis for Withholding Life-Preserving Treatment
A third principle is that an alleged poor ‘quality of life’ of a patient is an unethical basis
for denial of life-preserving medical treatment.  In the words of Pope Francis:
11 Pius XII, ‘The Prolongation of Life: Allocution to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists,’ (24 
November 1957), The Pope Speaks, 4:4, 1958, 395.
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In fact, in the light of faith and right reason, human life is always sacred and always ‘of
quality’. There is no human life that is more sacred than another – every human life is
sacred – just as there is no human life qualitatively more significant than another . . . .12
In an official letter on ‘Quality of Life and Ethics of Health Care’, Pope John Paul II
emphasized:
[T]he human person should be recognized and respected in any condition of health,
infirmity or  disability. ...  However,  in  our  time  the  meaning  which  the  expression
“quality  of  life”  is  gradually  acquiring  is  often  far  from  this  basic  interpretation,
founded on a correct philosophical and theological anthropology.  Indeed, under the
impetus of the society of well-being, preference is being given to a notion of quality of
life that is both reductive and selective: it  would consist in the ability to enjoy and
experience  pleasure  or  even in  the  capacity  for  self-awareness  and participation  in
social  life.  As  a  result,  human  beings  who  are  not  yet  or  are  no  longer  able  to
understand and desire or those who can no longer enjoy life as sensations and relations
are denied every form of quality of life.13
Similarly, in an allocution he said: 
I feel the duty to reaffirm strongly that the intrinsic value and personal dignity of every
human being do not change, no matter what the concrete circumstances of his or her
life. A man, even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of his higher functions, is
and always will be a man, and he will never become a ‘vegetable’ or an ‘animal.’14
Consequently, as  noted  by the  bishops’ committee  from the  United  States  as  cited
earlier:
A  means  considered  ordinary  or  proportionate  for  other  patients  should  not  be
considered  extraordinary  or  disproportionate  for  severely  impaired  patients  solely
because of a judgment that their lives are not worth living.15
To put it another way: if a treatment would be considered ordinary for a virile young
man  in  his  20’s,  then  it  should  not  be  deemed  extraordinary  for  a  woman  with  Down
Syndrome or an elderly man with Alzheimer’s disease. And just as it would be unethical to
12 Pope Francis, Allocution Ad Associationem catholicorum Medicorum Italiae. English translation: Address of 
His Holiness Pope Francis To Participants in the Commemorative Conference Of the Italian Catholic 
Physicians’ Association On the Occasion of its 70th Anniversary of Foundation Address to Association of Italian
Catholic Doctors (15 November 2014).
13 Pope John Paul II, Letter: Praesidi Pontificiae Academiae pro Vida occasione studiorum Conventus de 
qualitate vitae et salutis ethica missus. English translation: Letter to the President of the Pontifical Academy for 
Life on the Occasion of a Study Congress on ‘Quality of Life and Ethics of Health’ (19 February 2005).
14 Pope John Paul II, Allocution Ad catholicos medicos de curatione aegrotorum en stato <<vegetativo>> 
versantibus.  English translation: Address to the Participants in the International Congress on ‘Life-sustaining 
Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas,’ (20 March 2004) §4 (Hereafter, 
Acm).
15 National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Pro-Life Committee, Op. Cit.
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withhold even extraordinary treatment because of an intent to cause or hasten death, it would
also  be wrong to withhold even extraordinary treatment  for the reason that  the patient’s
quality of life is said to be poor – because that would amount to the same thing.  If the reason
life-preserving  treatment  of  any type  is  denied  is  because  the  patient’s quality  of  life  is
considered poor, that is tantamount to withholding it with the motivation of shortening that
person’s life because it is allegedly not worth living and the patient (or the patient’s family or
society) would be better off if she or he were dead.
Pope John Paul II warned of the consequences of such analysis:
[T]o  admit  that  decisions  regarding  man’s  life  can  be  based  on  the  external
acknowledgment  of  its  quality,  is  the  same  as  acknowledging  that  increasing  and
decreasing levels of quality of life, and therefore of human dignity, can be attributed
from an external perspective to any subject,  thus introducing into social  relations a
discriminatory and eugenic principle.16 
The  fundamental  equality  in  value  of  all  human  beings  was  reaffirmed  by  the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in its 2008 “Instruction  Dignitas Personae on
Certain Bioethical Questions,” when it wrote:
[T]he reality of the human being for the entire span of life, both before and after birth,
does not allow us to posit either a change in nature or a gradation in moral value, since
it  possesses  full  anthropological  and ethical  status.   .  .  .  This  value  belongs  to  all
without distinction. By virtue of the simple fact of existing, every human being must be
fully respected. The introduction of discrimination with regard to human dignity based
on biological, psychological, or educational development, or based on health-related
criteria, must be excluded.17
D. The Optional Nature of Extraordinary Treatment
A  fourth  principle  of  Catholic  treatment  ethics  is  that  extraordinary  treatment  is
optional for patients, not forbidden. It is not uncommon to encounter the misunderstanding
that assumes extraordinary treatment is actually unethical.18  In one of the allocutions most
commonly referred to as the initial source for the modern development of the understanding
of Catholic treatment ethics, Pope Pius XII said, ‘[O]ne is not forbidden to take more than the
strictly necessary steps to preserve life and health so long as he does not fail in some more
important duty.’19 The 1980 Declaration on Euthanasia explained, ‘[I]t is permitted, with the
patient’s consent,  to  have recourse to  the means provided by the most advanced medical
techniques,  even if  these means are still  at  the experimental  stage and are not without a
certain  risk.  By accepting  them,  the  patient  can  even  show generosity  in  the  service  of
humanity.’ Indeed, the declaration said that withdrawal of extraordinary means requires the
16 John Paul II, Acm §3.
17 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Instruction Dignitas Personae. English translation: 
Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions (8 September 2008) §§5, 8. 
18 See, e.g., Anne Orne-Smith & John Spicer, Ethics in General Practice (Abingdon, Oxon: Radcliffe Medical 
Press, 2001), 197; I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1988), 318.
19 Pope Pius XII, ‘The Prolongation of Life: Allocution to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists,’ (24 
November 1957), The Pope Speaks, 4:4 (1958), 395-98.
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patient’s  consent:  ‘It  is  also  permitted,  with  the  patient’s  consent,  to  interrupt  these
means ....’20
II. The Ethical Obligations and Rights of Health Care Providers
What is the role of the conscience of the health care provider? A doctor might assert
either that a patient is rejecting treatment the doctor has a moral obligation to provide, or else
that the patient is seeking treatment the doctor has a moral obligation to deny.
The  Catechism  states  that  while  ‘A  human  being  must  always  obey  the  certain
judgment of his conscience’ it is important that ‘Conscience must be informed and moral
judgment enlightened’ and ‘formation of conscience’ is to be ‘guided by the authoritative
teaching of the Church.’21 ‘[I]t can happen that moral conscience remains in ignorance . . .
and  makes  erroneous  judgments.  .  .  .  This  ignorance  can  often  be  imputed  to  personal
responsibility.  This is the case when a man “takes little trouble to find out what is true and
good . . . .” [R]ejection of the Church’s authority and her teaching . . . can be at the source of
errors of judgment in moral conduct.”22 Under Catholic teaching, therefore, the conscience of
a health care provider ought not to be misled by either ignorance or rejection of elements of
that teaching.
A. When a Patient Rejects Ordinary Treatment
A doctor might well conclude that a patient is rejecting ordinary medical treatment that
the patient has an ethical duty to accept. Certainly the doctor can and should counsel the
patient to accept the treatment.  But what if the patient adamantly refuses?
Later in this article, we will consider whether the secular law ought to require treatment
in such circumstances.23  But what of the conscience of the doctor?  In 1957, Pope Pius XII
clarified the duties of the physician:
The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the patient. The doctor, in
fact, has no separate or independent right where the patient is concerned. In general he
can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives
him permission.24
Thus, a physician’s conscience formed in accordance with Catholic teaching would not
dictate  a  duty  to  force  even  ordinary  treatment  on  an  unwilling  patient,  or  to  preclude
continuing to provide health care to a patient who has rejected certain ordinary treatment.
B. When a Health Care Provider Seeks to Deny Requested Treatment
Let us turn to the opposite case. Today it is often contended that medical personnel or
facilities  may ethically  choose  to  refuse  to  provide  life-preserving treatment  to  a  patient
20 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Declaratio de Euthanasia. English translation 
Declaration on Euthanasia (5 May 1980), IV.
21 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§1790, 1783, 1785.
22 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§1790, 1791, 1792.
23 See text accompanying notes 31-34.
24 Pius XII, Pope. ‘The Prolongation of Life: Allocution to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists,’ (24
November 1957), The Pope Speaks, 4:4 (1958), 395-98. Official text in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 49:12 (1957), 
1027-33. Also see note 31 and accompanying text.
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despite the choice and direction of the patient or the patient’s legal surrogates to do so.25  The
asserted  basis  may be  that  the  directed  treatment  is  futile  or  ethically  inappropriate.  As
described by the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, ‘Some physicians use
“futile”  narrowly,  considering  treatments  to  be  futile  if  they  would  be  physiologically
ineffective or  would fail  to  postpone death....  Many physicians  embrace a  broader, more
elastic understanding of the term. ... [A] treatment might be seen as futile if it does not offer
what physicians consider an acceptable quality of life. For example, in one survey, a majority
of physicians agreed that for a severely demented patient with Alzheimer’s disease,  CPR
[cardio-pulmonary resuscitation]  would  be  “so  clearly  inappropriate  or  futile  on  medical
grounds  that  physicians  should  be  permitted  to  institute  DNR  status  based  on  clinical
judgment, without obtaining consent.”26
1. Futile Treatment
There can be little doubt that a physician may refuse to provide a treatment directed by
or on behalf of a patient that in reasonable medical judgment is physiologically futile. Such a
treatment would not in fact be effective in preventing or delaying the patient’s death, so the
doctor would not actually be denying life-preserving treatment. But what of a physician who
believes it violates his or her conscience to provide treatment that would keep alive a patient
the doctor deems to have an unacceptable quality of life?  Or what if the physician judges the
requested treatment extraordinary, and has a conscientious belief it is unethical to provide that
extraordinary treatment?
2. Denial of Treatment Based on Quality of Life
This article has already detailed how clearly Catholic teaching rejects the view that
‘decisions regarding man’s life can be based on the external acknowledgment of its quality’.27
It follows that a health care provider could not, based on a well-formed conscience, validly
refuse  to  provide  a  patient  life-saving  medical  treatment  based  on  a  judgment  that  the
patient’s quality of life was unacceptable.
3. Extraordinary Treatment
What  about  a  doctor  who  objects  that  the  treatment  sought  by  the  patient  is
extraordinary treatment? 
Of key importance is that,  as demonstrated above, under Catholic teaching it  is the
patient who may choose whether or not to employ extraordinary treatment – a point re-stated
by the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which adds that when the patient is incompetent to
do so,  it  is  the patient’s legal  surrogate on whom the responsibility falls:  ‘Discontinuing
25 See generally Robert Powell Center for Medical Ethics, Will Your Advance Directive Be Followed?; Meisel, 
Cerminara, & Pope, The Right to Die [:] The Law of End-of-Life Decisionmaking §§13.03,13.07A.  Also see 
note 18 and accompanying text.
26 New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Others Must Choose: Deciding for Patients Without 
Capacity (New York: n.p., 1992), pp. 196-97, quoting N. Spritz, “Views of Our Membership Concerning the 
DNR Issue and the New York State DNR Law,” in Legislating Medical Ethics: A Study of New York’s DNR Law,
ed. R. Baker and M. Strosburg, Philosophy and Medicine Series (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
27 John Paul II, Acm §3.
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medical procedures that are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the
expected outcome can be legitimate; . . . . The decisions should be made by the patient if he is
competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the patient, whose reasonable
will and legitimate interests must always be respected.’28
But what  of the  Declaration’s subsequent  statement  that  it  is  ‘the doctors who are
specially competent’ who ‘may in particular judge that the investment . . . is disproportionate
to the results foreseen; they may also judge that the techniques applied impose on the patient
strain or suffering out of proportion with the benefits which he or she may gain from such
techniques’? That statement recognizes that those who are expert in providing health care are
particularly capable of evaluating the burdens of treatment in comparison with its benefits, an
assessment  which  is  integral  to  the  judgment  whether the  means  are  ordinary  or
extraordinary. 
It does not alter the validity of the Declaration’s previous statement that extraordinary
means may be interrupted only “with the patient’s consent.” Indeed, the sentence is preceded
by the statement, ‘for such a decision to be made [to reject extraordinary means], account will
have to be taken of the reasonable wishes of the patient and the patient’s family, as also of the
advice of the doctors who are specially competent in the matter.’ The critical word here is
‘advice’. That one may give advice does not authorize one to compel the decision-maker to
follow that advice.
Similarly, in context the word ‘anyone’ in the  Declaration on Euthanasia’s statement
“one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is already
in  use  but  which  carries  a  risk  or  is  burdensome” refers  to  the  patient,  not  to  a  doctor
attending the patient. This is clarified by the next sentence, which states, ‘Such a refusal is
not the equivalent of suicide. . . .’ Suicide is, of course, self killing. If the term ‘anyone’ were
intended to encompass the health care provider, the next sentence would logically have read,
‘Such a refusal is not the equivalent of euthanasia. . . .’
That understanding also clarifies the meaning of the following two sentences: ‘When
inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take
the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted. In such circumstances the doctor has no reason to reproach himself with failing
to help the person in danger.’ The ‘such circumstances’ are the circumstances in which the
patient has declined extraordinary treatment, or at least such a decision has been made with
the consent of the patient – or, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church §2278 establishes, of
‘those legally entitled to act for [an incompetent] patient’. The sentences cannot validly be
read as establishing that it is doctors who are to ‘take the decision’ to ‘refuse . . . treatment’
without the consent – and, indeed, against the will – of the patient or the patient’s surrogates.
This interpretation is reinforced by the definitive teaching of Pius XII, earlier quoted,
that ‘The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the patient. The doctor, in
fact, has no separate or independent right where the patient is concerned.’29
28 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §2278.
29 Pius XII, Pope. ‘The Prolongation of Life: Allocution to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists,’ (24
November 1957), The Pope Speaks, 4:4 (1958), 395-98. Official text in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 49:12 (1957), 
1027-33.
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John Paul II has warned of the particular danger of physicians usurping the role of
decision-making determining that a patient will die:
The  height  of  arbitrariness  and  injustice  is  reached  when  certain  people,  such  as
physicians . . . , arrogate to themselves the power to decide who ought to live and who
ought to die.  . . . Thus the life of the person who is weak is put into the hands of the
one who is strong; in society the sense of justice is lost, and mutual trust, the basis of
every authentic interpersonal relationship, is undermined at its root.
Indeed, as patients we entrust ourselves in a strikingly dependent and helpless way to
the care of medical personnel. When they cannot be counted on to try, to the utmost of their
skill and available techniques, to provide physiologically effective medical treatment that we
seek to preserve our lives, but instead arrogate to themselves the ultimate say in whether we
are allowed to live or die the warning attributed to Dr. Christopher Hufeland applies: ‘If the
physician presumes to take into consideration in his work whether a life has value or not, the
consequences  are  boundless  and  the  physician  becomes  the  most  dangerous  man  in  the
state.’30 
III. Secular Law and Treatment Ethics
Having summarized central principles of Roman Catholic medical treatment ethics, the
article now considers to what extent they can or ought to be reflected in secular human law.
A. Omission of Treatment With Intent to Cause Death
The  first  principle  described  emphasizes  that  deliberate  omission  of  life-preserving
treatment with the intent to cause or hasten death is ethically just as much euthanasia as is
taking action directly to kill the patient, as by a lethal injection or prescription. However, it is
a well-established legal concept that medical treatment requires informed consent:
At common law, all competent adults can consent to and refuse medical treatment. If
consent is not established, there may be legal consequences for health professionals.
Under  the  law  of  trespass,  patients  have  a  right  not  be  subjected  to  an  invasive
procedure  without  consent  or  other  lawful  justification,  such  as  an  emergency  or
necessity.31
Relying on this legal concept, it is certainly legally possible for a competent adult to
refuse life-preserving treatment with the stated or unstated intent of causing or hastening
death, and thus accomplish what, ethically speaking, is equivalent to suicide. To the extent
that  the  law authorizes  surrogates  to  make health  care  decisions  on behalf  of  minors  or
incompetent adults, it is also possible for them to direct denial of life-preserving treatment to
30 As quoted by John Harvey, ‘Should Health Care Be Rationed? The Physician’s Viewpoint’, The Linacre 
Quarterly 61:1(1994), 66, 69. 
31 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws (DP 81), 
§10.47.
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the patient with such an intent, ethically committing euthanasia. Indeed, given the prevalence
of  a  “Culture  of  Death”  in  contemporary  society,32 rejection  or  denial  of  life-preserving
treatment with the intent of causing or hastening death is unquestionably quite common.
Ought  efforts  be  undertaken to  reform the law of  informed consent  in  an effort  to
prevent such cases of ethical euthanasia? The difficulty is that while medical treatment that
can preserve life is frequently withheld or withdrawn with death-inducing intent, it is also
possible to withhold or withdraw such treatment without such an intent, on the grounds that
in the particular circumstances it is disproportionate or that providing it would go beyond the
reasonably  expectable  ordinary  duty  of  care,  and  thus  that  the  rejected  treatment  is
extraordinary and ethically optional.
In  practice,  therefore,  distinguishing  treatment  rejection  that  amounts  to  euthanasia
from  rejection  of  treatment  that  is  not  morally  obligatory  very  frequently  depends  on
knowing the subjective intent of the decision-maker. Aquinas noted that ‘man can make laws
about  matters  that  are  capable of being judged.  But  man cannot  make a judgment about
internal motivations that are hidden, but only about external actions that are public.’33
Supposing that the law were to prohibit withholding or withdrawing potentially life-
saving  treatment  when  done  with  the  intent  to  cause  or  hasten  death,  then,  given  the
complexity of the factors that determine the proportionality of treatment,  decision-makers
could quickly learn to disguise their true intent by describing their motivation in other terms
that were legally acceptable. Suppose a treatment (call it A) is judged to have a 75% chance
of preserving life, a 10% chance of a complication bringing immediate death, and a 45% risk
of causing serious disability, while without treatment there is a 60% chance of death within a
few months. (In the real world the probabilities are unlikely to be so precise.) A decision-
maker who considers death preferable to serious disability could for that reason unethically
reject treatment, but might also plausibly cite the principle of proportionality as justifying an
ethical choice to prefer the 40% chance of long-term life without treatment over the 10%
chance of immediate death with it.
Often the choices will be more complex still.  Consider that in most cases there are
alternative  possible  treatments  for  a  given  disease  or  injury,  with  varying  degrees  of
probability of success in preserving life to be balanced against varying degrees of probability
of complications or side effects – including those that might themselves risk death.  Suppose
that besides treatment A there is an alternative treatment B with a 40% chance of preserving
life, a 1% chance of a complication causing immediate death, and a 2% chance of causing
serious disability. A decision-maker believing that death is preferable to life with disability
could for that reason unethically choose B over A, but could also plausibly ethically choose
either A or B based on the principle of proportionality. 
How then, realistically, could a law prohibiting rejection of treatment with the intent of
causing  or  hastening death  be  enforced?  Might  one  envision  panels  of  medically trained
overseers reviewing in real time every case in which potentially life-saving treatments were
being balanced against each other, or balanced against no treatment, trying to ferret out the
underlying subjective motivation?  In emergency situations when hours or even minutes may
count,  how could there be time for adequate due process? Who would appoint,  and who
32 Cf. John Paul II, EV §12.
33 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2-1, Q.91, Art. 4.
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review the decisions of, such judges? Would there be provision for appeals? Given the vast
number of such situations, where would the resources – in time, facilities, and funds – be
found to  administer  such a  system? Would such resources  need to  be diverted  from,  for
example, financing the very health care provision of which such a regime was intended to
ensure? And considering the universal intrusiveness of such a system, would it not smack of a
police state?
In  the  words  of  Aquinas,  ‘[I]n  human government  it  is  right  for  those  who are  in
authority to tolerate some evils so as not to prevent other goods or to avoid some worse evil
from occurring’.34 Even  if  the  treatment  ethics  this  article  has  described  dominated  the
contemporary culture and could command the political and legislative power to pass laws to
ensure its observance, it would be imprudent and counterproductive to attempt to construct
and  implement  such  a  regime.  The  realistic  alternative  way  to  reduce  the  incidence  of
unethical rejection of medical treatment amounting to passive euthanasia must come from
greatly enhanced education and counseling in the normative ethics summarized in this article.
B. Assisting Suicide
Supporters of the legalization of assisting suicide sometimes contend that it is irrational
and arbitrary for governments to prevent lethal injections or prescriptions since they allow
rejection  of  treatment  with  a  similar  intent  of  causing  death.  Yet  that  argument  fails  to
recognize  the  critical  distinction  between the  law’s ability to  recognize  the  unmistakable
death-causing intent in direct killing, and the law’s inability realistically to disentangle cases
in which treatment is rejected with lethal intent from cases in which treatment is rejected for
legitimate and ethically acceptable reasons. That it is impractical for the law effectively and
enforceably to prevent most cases of “passive” euthanasia does not make it arbitrary for the
law to protect against ethically equivalent cases of “active” euthanasia in which the problem
of differentiating intent does not arise.35 Just because the law refrains from attempting to act
when it would be fruitless to do so does not make it irrational for the law to act when it can
be effective to do so.
C. Appeal to Secular Standards
Of course, it is far from being the case that Catholic ethics, relating to health care or
otherwise, pervade the contemporary culture. In a pluralistic society, relying solely on the
authority  of  Catholic  teaching  is  unlikely  to  convince  secular  legislators  representing
constituents of varying religions and of no religion.  Indeed, in this context Catholic teaching
documents  have  explicitly  sought  to  address  a  wide  audience  extending  beyond not  just
Roman  Catholics  but  also  beyond  the  members  of  other  religions.  For  example,  the
Introduction to the Declaration on Euthanasia states:
It is hoped that this Declaration will meet with the approval of many people of good
will, who, philosophical or ideological differences notwithstanding, have nevertheless a
lively awareness of the rights of the human person. These rights have often, in fact,
been  proclaimed  in  recent  years  through  declarations  issued  by  International
34 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2-2, Q.10, Art. 11.
35 For a similar argument in the context of the constitutional law of the United States, see Marzen, O’Dowd, 
Crone & Balch,‘ “Suicide: A Constitutional Right”– Reflections Eleven Years Later’, Duquesne Law Review,  
35, 1996, 270-74.
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Congresses . . . ; and since it is a question here of fundamental rights inherent in every
human  person,  it  is  obviously wrong to  have  recourse  to  arguments  from political
pluralism or religious freedom in order to deny the universal value of those rights.36
Similarly, the encyclical  Evangelium Vitae was addressed not  just  to  “the sons  and
daughters of the Church” but also appealed, “May these words . . . reach all people of good
will who are concerned for the good of every man and woman and for the destiny of the
whole of society!”37
It is beyond the scope of this article to enter in detail into the strong arguments for laws
that protect against assisting suicide and active euthanasia that are independent of religious
conceptions  of  the  sanctity  of  life.38 Such  philosophers  as  John  Locke  have  advanced
arguments that the right to life is logically inalienable, arguments that are quite separate from
the religious view that human beings are stewards of their lives rather than sovereign over
them.39 More  likely to  gain  traction  in  the  contemporary secular  debate  is  the  empirical
evidence that those who are suicidal – including people with terminal illness – are almost
invariably  affected  by  judgment-impairing,  treatable  psychological  conditions  that  create
“tunnel vision” blinding them to non-lethal ways to address the circumstances that lead them
to see continuance of  their lives as intolerable.40  The experience of those countries that have
legalized assisting suicide demonstrates that in practice legalization does not limit itself to
supposedly  autonomous  decisions  of  competent  adults,  but  extends  to  the  imposition  of
nonvoluntary and involuntary death on people with disabilities.41
D. Discriminatory Denial of Life-Preserving Treatment
The third and fourth principles of Catholic treatment ethics described earlier establish
that the quality of life of the patient must not motivate denial of treatment decisions, and that
whether  or  not  to  obtain  extraordinary treatment  is  an  ethically  optional  (not  forbidden)
judgment to be made by the patient or those legally entitled to act for an incompetent patient
rather than others (such as physicians). A particularly strong secular case can be made for
laws  that  protect  the  right  of  patients  or  their  surrogates  to  choose  life-saving treatment
against the wishes of health care facilities or personnel who, on the basis of a view that the
patient’s allegedly poor quality of life makes it not worth living, seek to override that choice.
The  Sacred  Congregation  for  the  Doctrine  of  the  Faith  has  taken  notice  of  the
congruence  of  the  Church’s  moral  teaching  with  the  growth  in  protections  against
discrimination:
[H]uman history has . . . shown real progress in the understanding and recognition of
the  value  and  dignity  of  every  person  as  the  foundation  of  the  rights  and  ethical
imperatives  by  which  human  society  has  been,  and  continues  to  be  structured.
Precisely in the name of promoting human dignity, therefore, practices and forms of
36 SCDF, Declaration on Euthanasia.
37 John Paul II, EV §5.
38 For a brief summary, see Ben White & Lindy Willmott, How Should Australia Regulate Voluntary 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 17-19.
39 Marzen, O’Dowd, Crone & Balch, ‘Suicide: A Constitutional Right?,’ Duquesne Law Review, 24:1, 1985, 
41-44.
40 Ibid., 107-27.
41 See, e.g., Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure.
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behaviour harmful to that dignity have been prohibited. Thus, for example, there are
legal  and  political  –  and  not  just  ethical  –  prohibitions  of  racism,  slavery,  unjust
discrimination and marginalization of women, children, and ill  and disabled people.
Such prohibitions bear witness to the inalienable value and intrinsic dignity of every
human being and are a sign of genuine progress in human history.42
As the Australian Human Rights Commission points out:
The  Disability  Discrimination  Act  1992  protects  individuals  across  Australia  from
unfair treatment in many parts of public life. The Act makes disability discrimination
unlawful and promotes equal rights, equal opportunity and equal access for people with
disabilities. 
The Commission also has responsibilities to promote the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which Australia ratified in 2008.43
The principle  that  people  should  not  be  discriminated  against  because  of  disability
correlates well with the principle that they should not be denied life-saving treatment based
on their ‘quality of life.’
An example of a law rooted in the non-sectarian universal principles of human equality
and non-discrimination that is congruent with these principles was enacted in 2013 in a state
of the United States of America.  Entitled the Oklahoma Nondiscrimination in Treatment Act,
its core requirement provides:
A health care provider shall not deny to a patient a life-preserving health care
service the provider  provides to  other  patients,  and the provision of which is
directed  by  the  patient  or  a  person  legally  authorized  to  make  health  care
decisions for the patient:
1. On the basis of a view that treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or
terminally ill individual as of lower value than extending the life of an individual
who is younger, nondisabled, or not terminally ill; or
2. On the basis of disagreement with how the patient or person legally authorized
to  make  health  care  decisions  for  the  patient  values  the  trade-off  between
extending the length of the patient’s life and the risk of disability.44
Such an approach provides a model of how those who abide by the essential precepts of
Catholic treatment ethics can find common ground in the secular arena to secure the right of
the most vulnerable among us to be protected from the discriminatory devaluation of their
lives and the unjust denial of life-saving medical treatment in violation of their fundamental
right to live. 
Conclusion
42 The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical 
Questions,” ¶ 37, Rome, 20 June 2008. Official text in AAS 100 (2008), 1-76. English translation 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-
personae_en.html.
43 “About Disability Rights,” Australian Human Rights Commission, accessed 27 October 2016, 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/disability-rights/about-disability-rights.
44 63 Okla Stat. §3090.3A.
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Roman Catholicism teaches a nuanced treatment ethics addressing the complexity of
decisions about the provision or withholding of life-preserving treatment. While some of its
ethical principles, such as the duty to accept ordinary treatment, cannot effectively be applied
and enforced by secular law, others, such as preventing denial of treatment based on ‘quality
of life,’ at least when that denial is involuntary, are congruent with widely accepted secular
standards against discrimination based on disability. 
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